Suicide pilot sparks MI5 alert Britain's rogue "insiders" Staff nuclear transport industries subjected continuous psychological tests crash

MI5 has issued an alert over the threat posed by rogue workers in Britain’s nuclear, transport and public services after suicide pilot Andreas Lubitz killed 150 people in the Alps plane crash disaster.

And concerns are so great that one security source has warned: ‘However much physical security you have, if someone is already in there, there’s nothing you can do to stop them committing an act of sabotage or terrorism.’

MI5 is now giving advice on the risk posed by thousands of employees working in sensitive areas – known as ‘insiders’ – highlighted by the Germanwings disaster.

Warning: MI5 has issued an alert over the threat posed by rogue workers in Britain’s nuclear, transport and public services after co-pilot Andreas Lubitz killed 150 people in the Alps plane crash disaster

Co-pilot Andreas Lubitz, who was being treated for depression, was able to override a security system installed on flights following the 9/11 attacks as he flew the aircraft into the ground.

Guidance issued by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), a security agency accountable to the director general of MI5, recommends continuous psychological assessment of key employees, with the highest priority given to workers whose jobs pose the greatest risk to the public.

But a BA pilot, who has been with the company for several years and flies regularly around the world, claimed the airline did not carry out mental health checks.

The pilot, who did not wish to be named, said: ‘British Airways is more interested in checking whether I have a hernia than mental health.

‘There is no testing regarding mental health.’

A BA spokeswoman refused to discuss details of health checks carried out on pilots.

The CPNI has identified a number of motives for employees becoming an insider threat, including theft, revenge, a hunger for notoriety, political or religious ideology and fear or coercion, where external pressure is exerted on a worker.

Rescue workers and investigators work near debris at the crash site of the Germanwings Airbus A320

A CPNI study showed that three-quarters of insider acts were carried out by employees who had no malicious intent when joining the organisation, but whose loyalties changed after recruitment.

Disturbingly, it also found that in many circumstances the workers had been in their organisation for some years before going rogue.

Some of the more common insider acts include unauthorised disclosure of information – such as in the case of US whistleblower Edward Snowden – process corruption (where an employee illegitimately alters an internal process for their own ends) and corporate espionage.

The security source said: ‘Years ago, the emphasis was on external security. Now ‘‘the insider’’ is the growing threat, as seen in the cases of Edward Snowden and Lubitz.

‘We advise companies to look closely at their personnel. The higher security clearance they gain over their time of employment, the closer they should be monitored.’

by dailymail.co.uk